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Abstract
In the Kelso and Crawford (1982) model of job matching, we investigate agents’
demand/supply behavior at the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector. We prove a
striking property, termed max-min slackness, which states that the maximum labor
supply is strictly greater than the minimum labor demand. Building on this property,
we prove that the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector is also an equilibrium price
vector in the market where one (arbitrary) doctor is absent. Combining this finding
with the lattice property, we demonstrate that adding new doctors reduces wages,
which in turn harms the original doctors and helps the hospitals, at the doctor-optimal
stable outcome.
JEL Classification: C78; D44; D47
Keywords: Job matching; Competitive equilibria; Stable matching; Discrete convex
analysis
1 Introduction
The Kelso and Crawford (1982) model of job matching has been a basis for the analysis
of two-sided markets with monetary transfers. The model is suitable for analyzing situa-
tions in which (i) objects are traded in discrete units, and (ii) prices can be finely adjusted
and indifferences over objects enter the analysis. The auction model with heterogeneous
commodities (Gul and Stacchetti 1999, Ausubel 2006) and the trading network model (Hat-
field et al. 2013, Fleiner et al. 2018) can be viewed as a special case and a generalization
∗Waseda Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University, 1-6-1, Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo
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of the Kelso-Crawford model, respectively.1 The model has three essential results: (i) the
Walrasian equilibria coincide with the stable outcomes (Kelso and Crawford 1982); (ii) the
equilibrium price vectors always exist (Kelso and Crawford 1982); and (iii) the set of equi-
librium price vectors forms a lattice (Kojima et al. 2018a). The last two results imply that
there exists a doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector (henceforth, D-vector). The properties
of the D-vector have been studied extensively, especially in terms of strategic behaviors.
The purpose of the present paper is to uncover the salient features of the D-vector in
terms of the agents’ demand/supply behavior and derive new theoretical results. A job-
matching market can be viewed as a commodity market by identifying the “pairs” with
commodities. If a doctor chooses a pair (representing labor supply) and a hospital also
chooses it (representing labor demand), then this is interpreted as realization of a matching.
Equilibrium price vectors bring demand and supply into balance.2 Our first result shows
that, at the D-vector, the maximum labor supply is strictly greater than the minimum labor
demand at any commodity bundle (in a sense to be specified later). We call this property
max-min slackness to emphasize that the max-min inequality is not tight.
To develop some intuition for the slackness result, consider an auction model in which,
contrary to the job-matching model, the “one” side represents the demand side. Suppose
that there are one seller of one commodity and many buyers. In a second-price auction, at
least two buyers (possibly) demand the commodity, while only one seller supplies it. Namely,
demand is strictly greater than supply.
We apply max-min slackness to derive new results with economic implications. In real
job-matching markets, the set of job candidates often changes due to policy reforms.3 We
examine how this change affects the D-vector; to simplify the discussion, suppose that one
doctor leaves the market. Intuitively, this change leads to a decrease in labor supply and
induces excess demand. This is, however, not the case at the D-vector because supply is
strictly (+1) greater than demand (by max-min slackness), and removing one doctor induces
only a one-unit (−1) decrease in labor supply. Based on this observation, we prove that the
D-vector remains an equilibrium price vector in the market where one doctor is absent. By
combining this finding with the lattice property, we demonstrate that adding new doctors
always decreases wages, which in turn harms the original doctors and helps the hospitals.
Our new results make two contributions to the literature. First, the effect of adding/removing
1Furthermore, the Kelso-Crawford model has a close connection to the matching-with-contracts model
due to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005); see Echenique (2012).
2This sentence refers to a seemingly obvious fact, but defining the “balance” of demand and supply
is more complex than it appears, as combinatorial problems and indifferences over commodities enter the
analysis. We overcome this difficulty using the techniques in discrete convex analysis (see Theorem 3).
3For example, some developed countries have recently begun to accept new workers from developing
countries. Anti-discrimination laws intended to accelerate the hiring of minority/disabled people would
promote labor force participation.
2
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2019-001
----------------------------------------------
agents observed here is parallel to that in marriage markets (see Gale and Sotomayor (1985))
and enables a unified understanding of stable outcomes in two-sided markets. The second
contribution concerns application. Recently, market designers have emphasized the advan-
tages of implementing a stable outcome (a matching and match-specific salaries) to real
job-matching markets (see Crawford (2008) or Kojima et al. (2018a)). Our results help us
understand the welfare effect of adding new doctors at the doctor-optimal stable outcome.
Related literature
There is a stream of research on two-sided markets with monetary transfers. Previous
studied have analyzed the mechanism that implements the best equilibrium outcome for
the agents on one side. Most notably, such a mechanism is strategy-proof for unit-demand
agents. This fact was first observed by Vickrey (1961) in a second-price auction and later
extended to more general cases; see Demange (1982), Leonard (1983), Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Sotomayor (2017), Hatfield et al. (2018), Jagadeesan et al. (2018), and Schlegel (2019).4
Hatfield et al. (2014) and Hatfield et al. (2018) prove that, in the Kelso-Crawford model,
implementing the D-vector is not only strategy-proof for doctors but also induces efficient
investment choices.
The effect of adding new agents was first discovered by Gale and Sotomayor (1985) in
marriage markets. They prove that, at the woman-optimal stable matching, the entrance of
new women harms the original women and helps the men. In two-sided markets with mon-
etary transfers, parallel results have been obtained for some, albeit limited, cases. Section
7.1 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990) discusses the effect in a market with one seller and many
buyers.5 Our result generalizes this finding to many-to-one markets with non-quasi-linear
preferences.
The key analytical tool in this paper is discrete convex analysis developed by Murota
(2003). This theory enables us to convert complicated combinatorial problems to tractable
mathematical operations. Some recent studies utilize this strength. Kojima et al. (2018b)
study the framework of matching under constraints and prove that M\-convexity, a notion
of discrete convexity, is essential for implementing the deferred acceptance algorithm. Can-
dogan et al. (2016) translate trading network problems into M\-convex submodular flow
problems and conduct a refined analysis of competitive equilibria. See Murota (2016) for a
survey of applications of discrete convex analysis to economics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model.
4Schlegel (2019) deals with a general trading network model with non-quasi-linear preferences.
5Although not as closely related to our study, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) investigate the effect of
adding new bidders on the seller’s revenue in an auction model. They prove that adding a new bidder is
more profitable for the seller in expectation than holding an optimal auction.
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Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 presents concluding remarks. All proofs are
relegated to Section 5.
2 Model
Let D denote the set of doctors and H the set of hospitals. Let I ≡ D ∪ H. In
the standard interpretation of a job-matching model, these agents have preference relations
over the agents on the opposite side and participate in bilateral contracts. In this paper, we
identify the job-matching market with a commodity market by regarding the set Ω ≡ D×H
as objects.6 For example, for a doctor d ∈ D, being matched to h ∈ H is translated into
choosing the commodity (d, h) ∈ Ω. We further describe the consumption bundles by 0-1
vectors; let Ω˜ ≡ {0, 1}Ω.
For each d ∈ D, we define d’s consumption set by
Ω˜d =
{
α ∈ Ω˜ : |{h ∈ H : α(d,h) = 1}| ≤ 1 and α(d′,h) = 0 for all (d′, h) ∈ (D\{d})×H
}
.
(1)
Note that d can consume at most one commodity, representing that d can work for at most
one hospital in the job-matching context.
Each doctor d has a utility function Ud : Ω˜d × R → R that satisfies the following two
conditions, the second of which is due to Kojima et al. (2018a):
• Monotonicity and continuity: For any α ∈ Ω˜d, Ud(α, ·) is continuous and strictly
monotonic with respect to the second argument.
• Bounded compensability: There is a constant ∆d > 0 such that, for any α, α′ ∈ Ω˜d
and s ∈ R, we have Ud(α′, s+ ∆d) > Ud(α, s).
The complete vector of prices for all commodities is denoted by p ∈ RΩ. We define the
supply correspondence Xd : RΩ → Ω˜d by
Xd(p) =
{
α ∈ Ω˜d : Ud(α, p · α) ≥ Ud(β, p · β) for all β ∈ Ω˜d} for all p ∈ RΩ.
For each h ∈ H, we define h’s consumption set by
Ω˜h =
{
α ∈ Ω˜ : α(d,h′) = 0 for all (d, h′) ∈ D × (H\{h})
}
.
6This approach to the market was previously considered by Hatfield et al. (2013).
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Each hospital h has a revenue function7 uh : Ω˜h → R∪{−∞} that satisfies uh(0) = 0 and
the following condition:
• Monotonicity: For any α, β ∈ Ω˜h with α ≤ β, we have uh(α) ≤ uh(β).
For each p ∈ RΩ and α ∈ Ω˜h, h’s profit is given by uh[p](α) ≡ uh(α)− p · α; note that the
quasi-linearity assumption is imposed on firms. We define the demand correspondence
Xh : RΩ → Ω˜h by
Xh(p) =
{
α ∈ Ω˜h : uh[p](α) ≥ uh[p](β) for all β ∈ Ω˜h} for all p ∈ RΩ.
We make the following assumption due to Kelso and Crawford (1982):
• Substitutability: For any p, p′ ∈ RΩ with p ≤ p′, and any α ∈ Xh(p), there exists
β ∈ Xh(p′) such that pω = p′ω implies αω ≤ βω.
A commodity market derived from a job-matching market can be summarized as E =
〈D,H, (Ud)d∈D, (uh)h∈H〉.
3 Main results
3.1 Equilibrium price vector and max-min slackness
We say that p ∈ RΩ is an equilibrium price vector for E if8∑
d∈D
Xd(p) ∩
∑
h∈H
Xh(p) 6= ∅. (2)
Suppose that the above set is non-empty and choose a 0-1 vector from the set. Then, any
doctor-hospital pair (d, h) to which the vector assigns 1 (res. 0) is chosen from both (res. nei-
ther) of them, representing the coincidence between labor supply and labor demand. As this
choice maximizes utility (profit), the vector represents a Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
We cite two fundamental theorems:9
Theorem 1 (Existence (Kelso and Crawford 1982; Kojima et al. 2018a)). There exists an
equilibrium price vector for E.
7The value −∞ captures technological constraints (Hatfield et al. 2013, p.973) or institutional constraints
(Kojima et al. 2018a).
8The summation over sets represents the Minkowski sum.
9Existence also follows from Fleiner et al. (2018). The lattice structure and boundedness also follow from
Schlegel (2019). Both of these papers deal with a general trading network model.
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Theorem 2 (Lattice structure (Kojima et al. 2018a)). The set of equilibrium price vectors
for E is a complete sublattice.
By these theorems, there always exist unique maximum/minimum equilibrium price vec-
tors. We write p to denote the maximum equilibrium price vectors for E and call it the
doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector, shortly D-vector.
Next, we translate the above set-language definition of equilibrium price vectors into the
inequality-language definition. To this end, we introduce some preliminaries. For i ∈ I,
we define the min-requirement function Rˆi(·, ·) and the max-requirement function
Rˇi(·, ·) as follows:10
Rˆi(λ, p) = min{α · λ : α ∈ X i(p)} for all λ ∈ Ω˜ and p ∈ RΩ,
Rˇi(λ, p) = max{α · λ : α ∈ X i(p)} for all λ ∈ Ω˜ and p ∈ RΩ. (3)
To see the intended meaning of these functions, consider the set of commodities to which λ
assigns 1. Then, Rˆi(λ, p) (res. Rˇi(λ, p)) represents the minimum (res. maximum) number
of commodities that i requires from the set to form an optimal consumption bundle.
Theorem 3. p ∈ RΩ is an equilibrium price vector for E if and only if∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ, p) ≤
∑
d∈D
Rˇd(λ, p) and
∑
d∈D
Rˆd(λ, p) ≤
∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ, p) for all λ ∈ Ω˜.
The above system of inequalities can be interpreted as representing the balance of demand
and supply. To see this point, suppose that there exists λ ∈ Ω˜ such that the former inequality
fails, i.e., ∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ, p) >
∑
d∈D
Rˇd(λ, p).
Placing the above into the job-matching context, the left-hand side represents the minimum
number of doctors that the hospitals must hire. This number exceeds the right-hand side,
the maximum number of doctors who can work for the hospitals. Namely, excess demand is
present. In a similar vein, violation of the latter inequality is interpreted as excess supply.
Conversely, if all the inequalities hold, then no excess demand/supply occurs, which is the
essence of the notion of an equilibrium.
Remark 1. Yokote (2017) prove the inequality-language characterization of equilibrium
price vectors in the auction model due to Gul and Stacchetti (1999). Theorem 3 is a straight-
forward generalization of Yokote’s (2017) result and the proof is omitted. The only if part
10Gul and Stacchetti (2000) define Rˆi(·, ·) in the auction model and call it a requirement function.
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follows from the definition of an equilibrium price vector and the if part follows from the
discrete separation theorem.
We now turn our attention to the D-vector p¯. The salient feature of this vector becomes
transparent in terms of the inequality-language characterization.
Theorem 4 (Max-min slackness). At p¯, we have∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ, p¯) <
∑
d∈D
Rˇd(λ, p¯) for all λ ∈ {0, 1}Ω with λ 6= 0.
Proof. See Section 5.2.
The intuition for this theorem is as follows: p¯ is the best equilibrium price vector for the
doctors (salaries are sufficiently high), and the maximum labor supply becomes large enough
to strictly exceed the minimum labor demand.
3.2 Effect of adding/removing doctors
In real job-matching markets, the set of job candidates often changes due to policy
reforms. We investigate how p¯ changes when a doctor leaves/enters the market.
Fix d′ ∈ D, who is to be removed from the market. For each x ∈ RΩ, let x−d′ denote the
projection of x on R(D\{d′})×H . For each Ψ˜ ⊆ Ω˜, we define
Ψ˜−d′ =
{
α′ ∈ {0, 1}(D\{d′})×H : α′ = α−d′ for some α ∈ Ψ˜
}
.
For notational consistency, let RΩ−d′ ≡ R(D\{d′})×H . We define the reduced market E−d′ ≡
〈D\{d′}, H, (Ud−d′)d∈D\{d′}, (uh−d′)h∈H〉, where
• for each d ∈ D, Ud−d′(·, ·) denotes the restriction of Ud(·, ·) on Ω˜d−d′ × R; and
• for each h ∈ H, uh−d′(·) denotes the restriction of uh(·) on Ω˜h−d′ .
We remark that all the assumptions on utility/revenue functions are preserved in the reduced
market E−d′ . We define equilibrium price vectors for E−d′ in the same way as for E .
Bearing Theorems 3 and 4 in mind, we investigate the effect of removing d′ on p¯; consider
p¯−d′ in the reduced market. Clearly, excess supply never occurs for this vector, as only the
agent on the supply side is removed. What about excess demand? By Theorem 4, labor
supply is strictly (+1) larger than labor demand, while eliminating a unit-demand agent
yields only a one-unit decrease (−1) of supply. As a result, the max-min inequality of
Theorem 3 remains true in the reduced market, which leads us to the following theorem:
Theorem 5. p−d′ is an equilibrium price vector for E−d′.
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Proof. See Section 5.3.
We combine this theorem with Theorem 2 (lattice structure). For the D-vector q¯ ∈ RΩ−d′
for E−d′ , we have p¯−d′ ≤ q¯. Equivalently,
p¯ω ≤ q¯ω for all ω ∈ (D\{d′})×H.
That is, the entrance of new doctors always decreases wages. In view of utility/profit max-
imization, this change harms the doctors and helps the hospitals. This result helps us
understand the welfare effect of adding new doctors at the doctor-optimal stable outcome.
4 Concluding remarks
In Theorem 4, we revealed max-min slackness at the D-vector. Under the quasi-linearity
assumption, we can prove a parallel result for the hospital-optimal equilibrium price vector;
the maximum labor demand is strictly grater than the minimum labor supply. Note further
that Theorem 5 has a close connection to strategy-proofness of the doctor-optimal stable
mechanism. We will discuss these issues in an updated version of this paper.
5 Proofs
5.1 Preliminaries
5.1.1 Discrete convex analysis
We introduce basic concepts in discrete convex analysis (Murota 2003). For x ∈ RΩ, we
define
supp+x = {ω ∈ Ω : αω > 0}, supp−x = {ω ∈ Ω : αω < 0}.
For ω ∈ Ω, let 1lω ∈ Ω˜ denote the ω-th unit vector. Let 1l0 ≡ 0.
We say that uh(·) is an M\-concave function if for any α, β ∈ Ω˜h and any ω ∈ supp+(α−
β), there exists ψ ∈ supp−(α− β) ∪ {0} such that
uh(α) + uh(β) ≤ uh(α− 1lω + 1lψ) + uh(β + 1lω − 1lψ).
We say that Ψ˜ ⊆ Ω˜ with Ψ˜ 6= ∅ is an M\-convex set if for any α, β ∈ Ψ˜ and any ω ∈
8
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2019-001
----------------------------------------------
supp+(α− β), there exists ψ ∈ supp−(α− β) ∪ {0} such that
α− 1lω + 1lψ ∈ Ψ˜, β + 1lω − 1lψ ∈ Ψ˜.
Theorem 6 (Fujishige and Yang 2003; Murota 2003, Theorem 6.30). Let h ∈ H. The
following are equivalent:
• uh(·) satisfies substitutability.
• uh(·) is an M\-concave function.
• Xh(p) is an M\-convex set for all p ∈ RΩ.
We remark that, for any d ∈ D and p ∈ RΩ, Xd(p) consists of unit-vectors and thus forms
an M\-convex set. Hence, in our economy, every agent’s demanded (supplied) commodities
form an M\-convex set.
5.1.2 Additional notations and definitions for E
For α ∈ Ω˜ and d ∈ D, we define αd ∈ Ω˜ by
αdω =
αω if ω = (d, h) for some h ∈ H,0 otherwise.
For h ∈ H, we define αh ∈ Ω˜ analogously.
Let p ∈ RΩ be an equilibrium price vector for E (i.e., (2) holds). We say that α ∈ Ω˜ is
an equilibrium allocation at p if
α ∈
∑
d∈D
Xd(p) ∩
∑
h∈H
Xh(p).
For each i ∈ I, we define
Qˆi(λ, p) = {α ∈ X i(p) : α · λ = Rˆi(λ, p)}, Qˇi(λ, p) = {α ∈ X i(p) : α · λ = Rˇi(λ, p)}.
In words, Qˆi(λ, p) (res. Qˇi(λ, p)) represents the set of optimal consumption bundles that
attain the value of Rˆi(λ, p) (res. Rˇi(λ, p)).
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For λ, µ ∈ Ω˜, we define λ\µ ∈ Ω˜, λ ∨ µ ∈ Ω˜ and λ ∧ µ ∈ Ω˜ by
(λ\µ)ω =
1 if λω = 1 and µω = 0,0 otherwise,
(λ ∨ µ)ω =
1 if λω = 1 or µω = 1,0 otherwise, (λ ∧ µ)ω =
1 if λω = 1 and µω = 1,0 otherwise.
For λ ∈ Ω˜, let (λ) > 0 denote a sufficiently small number that satisfies, for any i ∈ I,
α /∈ X i(p¯) =⇒ α /∈ X i(p¯+ (λ) · λ). (4)
Such an (·) always exists by continuity of Ud(α, ·) for any d ∈ D and α ∈ Ω˜d.
For x ∈ RΩ, we define the `1-norm of x by
|x| =
∑
ω∈Ω
|xω|.
5.1.3 Characterization of equilibrium price vectors for E−d′
Fix d′ ∈ D. For d ∈ D\{d′}, let Xd−d′(·) denote the supply coorespondence induced from
Ud−d′(·). Similarly, for h ∈ H, let Xh−d′(·) denote the demand coorespondence induced from
uh−d′(·). For i ∈ I\{d′}, let Rˆi−d′(·, ·) and Rˇi−d′(·, ·) denote the max- and min-requirement
functions induced from X i−d′(·), respectively; formally, for λ ∈ Ω˜−d′ and p ∈ RΩ−d′ ,
Rˆi−d′(λ, p) = min{α · λ : α ∈ X i−d′(p)}, Rˇi−d′(λ, p) = max{α · λ : α ∈ X i−d′(p)}.
By definition, for any d ∈ D\{d′}, p ∈ RΩ and λ ∈ Ω˜, we have
Rˆd(λ, p) = Rˆd−d′(λ−d′ , p−d′), (5)
Rˇd(λ, p) = Rˇd−d′(λ−d′ , p−d′). (6)
The following is an immediate corollary of Theorem 3:
Corollary 1. Let d′ ∈ D. Then, p ∈ RΩ−d′ is an equilibrium price vector for E−d′ if and only
if ∑
h∈H
Rˆh−d′(λ, p) ≤
∑
d∈D
Rˇd−d′(λ, p) and
∑
d∈D
Rˆd−d′(λ, p) ≤
∑
h∈H
Rˇh−d′(λ, p) for all λ ∈ Ω˜−d′ .
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 4
5.2.1 The modified economy
We modify each doctor’s utility function in E so that increasing prices of the D-vector
has a “constant” effect on utility among optimal consumption bundles (see (10) below).
For each d ∈ D, we define Ud∗ : Ω˜d × R→ R by
Ud∗ (α, s) =

Ud(α, p¯ · α) + min
β∈Xd(p¯)
{
Ud
(
β, p¯ · β + (s− p¯ · α))− Ud(β, p¯ · β)}
if α ∈ Xd(p¯) and s ≥ p¯ · α,
Ud(α, s) otherwise.
(7)
We enumerate key properties of Ud∗ (·, ·):
For any α ∈ Ω˜d, we have Ud∗ (α, p¯ · α) = Ud(α, p¯ · α). (8)
For any (α, s) ∈ Ω˜d × R, we have Ud(α, s) ≥ Ud∗ (α, s). (9)
For any α, β ∈ Xd(p¯) and  > 0, we have Ud∗ (α, p¯ · α + ) = Ud∗ (β, p¯ · β + ). (10)
As Ud∗ (·, ·) is defined by the minimum of Ud(·, ·), it inherits the assumptions on Ud(·, ·). Let
Xd∗ (·) denote the supply correspondence induced from Ud∗ (·, ·). Let E∗ ≡ 〈D,H, (Ud∗ )d∈D, (uh)h∈H〉.
Recall that p¯ denotes the D-vector for E .
Claim 1. p¯ is the D-vector for E∗.
Proof. By (8), p¯ is an equilibrium price vector. Suppose to the contrary that p¯ is not the D-
vector for E∗. Then, by Theorems 1 and 2, there exists p∗ ∈ RΩ such that p∗ is the D-vector
for E∗ and satisfies
p∗ ≥ p¯,with strict inequality holding for at least one ω ∈ Ω. (11)
Let α¯, α∗ ∈ Ω˜ denote the equilibrium allocations at p¯ for E and at p∗ for E∗, respectively.
For any d ∈ D, we have
Ud(αd∗, p∗ · αd∗) ≥ Ud∗ (αd∗, p∗ · αd∗) ≥ Ud∗ (α¯d, p∗ · α¯d) ≥ Ud∗ (α¯d, p¯ · α¯d) = Ud(α¯d, p¯ · α¯d), (12)
where the first inequality follows from (9), the second inequality follows from αd∗ ∈ Xd∗ (p∗),
the third inequality follows from (11) and monotonicity of utility in money, and the last
equality follows from (8). If the above inequality is strict for at least one d ∈ D, then we
obtain a contradiction to group strategy-proofness of the doctor-optimal stable mechanism
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for doctors (see Schlegel (2019)). Hence, we must have
Ud(αd∗, p∗ · αd∗) = Ud(α¯d, p¯ · α¯d) for all d ∈ D. (13)
Let d ∈ D and αd ∈ Ω˜d be arbitrarily chosen. We prove that the following inequality holds:
Ud(αd, p∗ · αd) ≤ Ud(αd∗, p∗ · αd∗). (14)
To prove this, we consider two cases.
Case 1: Suppose αd ∈ Xd(p¯). Supose to the contrary that p¯ · αd < p∗ · αd. Then,
Ud(α¯d, p¯ · α¯d) = Ud(αd, p¯ · αd) = Ud∗ (αd, p¯ · αd)
< Ud∗ (α
d, p∗ · αd) ≤ Ud∗ (αd∗, p∗ · αd∗) ≤ Ud(αd∗, p∗ · αd∗),
where the first equality follows from αd, α¯d ∈ Xd(p¯), the second equality follows from
(8), the strict inequality follows from p¯ · αd < p∗ · αd and monotonicity of utility in
money, the penultimate inequality follows from αd∗ ∈ Xd∗ (p∗), and the last inequality
follows from (9). Thus, we obtain a contradiction to (13). Hence, p¯ · αd = p∗ · αd. It
follows that
Ud(αd, p∗ · αd) = Ud(αd, p¯ · αd) = Ud(α¯d, p¯ · α¯d) = Ud(αd∗, p∗ · αd∗),
where the first equality follows from p¯ · αd = p∗ · αd, the second equality follows from
αd, α¯d ∈ Xd(p¯), and the last equality follows from (13).
Case 2: Suppose αd /∈ Xd(p¯). Then,
Ud(αd, p∗ · αd) = Ud∗ (αd, p∗ · αd) ≤ Ud∗ (αd∗, p∗ · αd∗) ≤ Ud(αd∗, p∗ · αd∗),
where the first equality follows from the definition of U∗(·, ·), the first inequality follows
from αd∗ ∈ Xd∗ (p∗), and the second inequality follows from (9).
Hnece, in either case, we have (14). This means that p∗ is an equilibrium price vector
for E , with the corresponding equilibrium allocation α∗. Together with (11), we obtain a
contadiction to the maximality of p¯.
5.2.2 Proof of Theorem 4 for E∗
By Claim 1, p¯ is the D-vector for E∗. We prove Theorem 4 for E∗. For d ∈ D, let Rˆd∗(·, ·)
and Rˇd∗(·, ·) denote the max- and min-requirement functions induced from Xd∗ (·), respectively
12
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(see (3)).
We first prove two claims.
Claim 2. Let µ ∈ Ω˜ and p¯′ ≡ p¯ + (µ) · µ. Then, for any h ∈ H, α ∈ Qˆh(µ, p¯) implies
α ∈ Xh(p¯′). In particular, for any λ ∈ Ω˜, we have α · λ ≥ Rˆh(λ, p¯′).
Proof. For simplicity, we write  instead of (µ). Let α ∈ Qˆh(µ, p¯). Then, for any β ∈ Xh(p¯),
uh[p¯′](β) = uh[p¯](β)− β · ( · µ)
≤ uh[p¯](α)− β · ( · µ)
≤ uh[p¯](α)− α · ( · µ)
= uh[p¯′](α),
where the first inequality follows from α ∈ Xh(p¯) and the second inequality follows from
α · µ = Qˆh(µ, p¯) ≤ β · µ. Moreover, by (4), Xh(p¯′) ⊆ Xh(p¯). Together with the above
inequality, we obtain α ∈ Xh(p¯′). The last part of the statement follows from α ∈ Xh(p¯′)
and the definition of Rˆh(·, ·).
Claim 3. Let λ, µ ∈ Ω˜ and p¯′ ≡ p¯+ (µ) · µ. Then, for any d ∈ D and h ∈ H, the following
inequalities hold:
(i) Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′) ≤ Rˇd∗(µ, p¯)− Rˇd∗(µ\λ, p¯) + Rˆd∗(λ\µ, p¯).
(ii) Rˇh(λ, p¯′) ≥ Rˆh(µ, p¯)− Rˆh(µ\λ, p¯) + Rˇh(λ\µ, p¯).
(iii) Rˆh(λ, p¯′) ≤ Rˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯)− Rˆh(µ, p¯) + Rˆh(λ ∧ µ, p¯).
(iv) Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′) ≥ Rˇd∗(λ ∨ µ, p¯)− Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) + Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯).
Proof. For simplicity, we write  instead of (µ).
Proof of (i): Suppose not, i.e.,
Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′) > Rˇd∗(µ, p¯)− Rˇd∗(µ\λ, p¯) + Rˆd∗(λ\µ, p¯).
Since Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) ≥ Rˇd∗(µ\λ, p¯), for the above inequality to hold, we must have one of the
following two cases:
Case 1: Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′) = 1, Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) = 1, Rˇ
d
∗(µ\λ, p¯) = 1, and Rˆd∗(λ\µ, p¯) = 0.
Case 2: Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′) = 1, Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) = 0, Rˇ
d
∗(µ\λ, p¯) = 0, and Rˆd∗(λ\µ, p¯) = 0.
13
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We consider each case and derive a contradiction.
Case 1: By Rˇd∗(µ\λ, p¯) = 1, there exists α ∈ Xd∗ (p¯) with α · λ = 0. By (4) and (10),11 we
have α ∈ Xd∗ (p¯′). This implies that Rˆd∗(λ, p¯′) = 0, a contradiction to Rˆd∗(λ, p¯′) = 1.
Case 2: By Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) = 0 and Rˆ
d
∗(λ\µ, p¯) = 0, there exists α ∈ Xd∗ (p¯) such that α · λ ∨ µ = 0.
By Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) = 0, we have β ·µ = 0 for all β ∈ Xd∗ (p¯). Together with (4), we obtain α ∈ Xd∗ (p¯′).
This implies that Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′) = 0, a contradiction to Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′) = 1.
Proof of (ii): Let α ∈ Qˇh(λ, p¯′); equivalently, α ∈ Xh(p¯′) and Rˇh(λ, p¯′) = α · λ. Then, it
suffices to prove that
α · λ = α · µ− α · µ\λ+ α · λ\µ
≥ Rˆh(µ, p¯)− Rˆh(µ\λ, p¯) + Rˇh(λ\µ, p¯). (15)
By α ∈ Xh(p¯′) and (4), we have α ∈ Xh(p¯). Together with the definition of Rˆh(µ, p¯), we
have α · µ ≥ Rˆh(µ, p¯). Hence, for (15) to hold, it suffices to prove that
α · µ\λ ≤ Rˆh(µ\λ, p¯), (16)
α · λ\µ ≥ Rˇh(λ\µ, p¯). (17)
Proof of (16): Suppose to the contrary that α · µ\λ > Rˆh(µ\λ, p¯). Let β ∈ Qˆh(µ\λ, p¯) be
such that
|β − α| ≤ |β′ − α| for all β′ ∈ Qˆh(µ\λ, p¯). (18)
By the supposition, there exists ω ∈ supp+(α−β)∩supp+µ\λ. By M\-concavity, there exists
ψ ∈ supp−(α− β) ∪ {0} such that
uh(α) + uh(β) ≤ uh(α− 1lω + 1lψ) + uh(β + 1lω − 1lψ),
uh[p¯′](α) + uh[p¯](β) ≤ uh[p¯′](α− 1lω + 1lψ) + uh[p¯](β + 1lω − 1lψ)− p¯′ω + p¯′ψ + p¯ω − p¯ψ. (19)
Since ω ∈ supp+µ\λ, we have
p¯ω − p¯′ω = −. (20)
By the definition of p¯′,
−p¯ψ + p¯′ψ ≤ . (21)
11We need (10) to complete the logic here. To see this point, suppose that Xd∗ (p¯) = {1lω, 1lψ}, where
(λ∧µ)ω = 1 and (µ\λ)ψ = 1. Then, without (10), increasing the prices in supp+µ might entail 1lω ∈ Xd∗ (p¯′)
and 1lψ /∈ Xd∗ (p¯′). Then, we have Rˆd∗(λ, p¯′) = 1, which cannot yield a contracition.
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Since α ∈ Xh(p¯′) and β ∈ Xh(p¯), we have
uh[p¯′](α) ≥ uh[p¯′](α− 1lω + 1lψ), uh[p¯](β) ≥ uh[p¯](β + 1lω − 1lψ). (22)
(19)-(22) together imply that all the inequalities reduce to equalities. In particular, by (22),
α− 1lω + 1lψ ∈ Xh(p¯′), β + 1lω − 1lψ ∈ Xh(p¯).
If ψ ∈ supp+µ\λ, then β + 1lω − 1lψ ∈ Qˆh(µ\λ, p¯) and |β − α| > |(β + 1lω − 1lψ) − α|, a
contradiction to (18). Hence, ψ /∈ supp+µ\λ. Since µψ = 1 by (21), we must have λψ = 1.
Since ω ∈ supp+µ\λ, we have λω = 0. Then,
(α− 1lω + 1lψ) · λ > α · λ,
a contradiction to α ∈ Qˇh(λ, p¯′).
Proof of (17): Suppose to the contrary that α · λ\µ < Rˇh(λ\µ, p¯). Let β ∈ Qˇh(λ\µ, p¯) be
such that
|β − α| ≤ |β′ − α| for all β′ ∈ Qˇh(λ\µ, p¯). (23)
By the supposition, there exists ω ∈ supp+(β−α)∩supp+λ\µ. By M\-concavity, there exists
ψ ∈ supp−(β − α) ∪ {0} such that
uh(β) + uh(α) ≤ uh(β − 1lω + 1lψ) + uh(α + 1lω − 1lψ),
uh[p¯](β) + uh[p¯′](α) ≤ uh[p¯](β − 1lω + 1lψ) + uh[p¯′](α + 1lω − 1lψ)− p¯ω + p¯ψ + p¯′ω − p¯′ψ. (24)
Since ω ∈ supp+λ\µ, we have
p¯′ω − p¯ω = 0. (25)
By the definition of p¯′,
−p¯′ψ + p¯ψ ≤ 0, (26)
Since β ∈ Xh(p¯) and α ∈ Xh(p¯′), we have
uh[p¯](β) ≥ uh[p¯](β − 1lω + 1lψ), uh[p¯′](α) ≥ uh[p¯′](α + 1lω − 1lψ). (27)
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(24)-(27) together imply that all the inequalities reduce to equalities. In particular, by (27),
β − 1lω + 1lψ ∈ Xh(p¯), α + 1lω − 1lψ ∈ Xh(p¯′).
If ψ ∈ supp+λ\µ, then β − 1lω + 1lψ ∈ Qˇh(λ\µ, p¯) and |β − α| > |(β − 1lω + 1lψ) − α|, a
contradiction to (23). Hence, ψ /∈ supp+λ\µ. Since µψ = 0 by (26), we must have λψ = 0.
Since ω ∈ supp+λ\µ, we have λω = 1. Then,
(α + 1lω − 1lψ) · λ > α · λ,
a contradiction to α ∈ Qˇh(λ, p¯′).
Proof of (iii): Let α ∈ Ω˜h be such that
α ∈ Qˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯), (28)
α · µ ≤ α′ · µ for all α′ ∈ Qˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯), (29)
α · λ ∧ µ ≤ α′ · λ ∧ µ for all α′ ∈ Qˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯) with α′ · µ = α · µ. (30)
To prove the claim, it suffices to prove that
α · λ ≥ Rˆh(λ, p¯′), (31)
α · λ ≤ Rˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯)− Rˆh(µ, p¯) + Rˆh(λ ∧ µ, p¯). (32)
Proof of (31): In view of Claim 2, it suffices to prove that α ∈ Qˆh(µ, p¯). Suppose not. Let
β ∈ Qˆh(µ, p¯) be such that
|β − α| ≤ |β′ − α| for all β′ ∈ Qˆh(µ, p¯). (33)
By α /∈ Qˆh(µ, p¯), we have α · µ > β · µ. Hence, there exists ω ∈ supp+(α− β) ∩ supp+µ. By
M\-convexity, there exists ψ ∈ supp−(α− β) ∪ {0} such that
α− 1lω + 1lψ ∈ Xh(p¯), β + 1lω − 1lψ ∈ Xh(p¯).
If ψ ∈ supp+µ, then β + 1lω − 1lψ ∈ Qˆh(µ, p¯) and
|(β + 1lω − 1lψ)− α| < |β − α|,
a contradiction to (33). Hence, we have ψ /∈ supp+µ. If ψ /∈ supp+λ, together with
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ω ∈ supp+µ, we have
(α− 1lω + 1lψ) · λ ∨ µ < α · λ ∨ µ,
a contradiction to (28). Hence, ψ ∈ supp+λ\µ. Then, together with ω ∈ supp+µ, we have
α− 1lω + 1lψ ∈ Qˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯) and
(α− 1lω + 1lψ) · µ < α · µ,
a contradiction to (29).
Proof of (32): Suppose not, i.e.,
α · λ = α · λ ∨ µ− α · µ+ α · λ ∧ µ
> Rˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯)− Rˆh(µ, p¯) + Rˆh(λ ∧ µ, p¯). (34)
By (28), α · λ ∨ µ = Rˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯). By the definition of Rˆh(·, ·), we have α · µ ≥ Rˆh(µ, p¯).
Hence, for (34) to hold, we must have α · λ∧ µ > Rˆh(λ∧ µ, p¯). Let β ∈ Qˆh(λ∧ µ, p¯) be such
that
|β − α| ≤ |β′ − α| for all β′ ∈ Qˆh(λ ∧ µ, p¯). (35)
Since α · λ ∧ µ > β · λ ∧ µ, there exists ω ∈ supp+(α − β) ∩ supp+λ ∧ µ. By M\-convexity,
there exists ψ ∈ supp−(α− β) ∪ {0} such that
α− 1lω + 1lψ ∈ Xh(p¯), β + 1lω − 1lψ ∈ Xh(p¯).
If ψ ∈ supp+λ ∧ µ, then β + 1lω − 1lψ ∈ Qˆh(λ ∧ µ, p¯) and
|(β + 1lω − 1lψ)− α| < |β − α|,
a contradiction to (35). Hence, ψ /∈ supp+λ ∧ µ. If ψ /∈ supp+λ ∨ µ, together with ω ∈
supp+λ ∧ µ, we have
(α− 1lω + 1lψ) · λ ∨ µ < α · λ ∨ µ,
a contradiction to (28). Hence, ψ ∈ supp+λ∨µ, which together with ω ∈ supp+λ∧µ implies
α− 1lω + 1lψ ∈ Qˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯). If ψ /∈ supp+µ, together with ω ∈ supp+λ ∧ µ, we have
(α− 1lω + 1lψ) · µ < α · µ,
17
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a contradiction to (29). Hence, the remaining possibility is that ψ ∈ supp+µ\λ. In this case,
again together with ω ∈ supp+λ ∧ µ, we have
(α− 1lω + 1lψ) · µ = α · µ, (α− 1lω + 1lψ) · λ ∧ µ < α · λ ∧ µ,
a contradiction to (30).
Proof of (iv): Suppose not, i.e.,
Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′) < Rˇd∗(λ ∨ µ, p¯)− Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) + Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯).
Since Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) ≥ Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯), for the above inequality to hold, we must have one of the
following two cases:
Case 1: Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′) = 0, Rˇd∗(λ ∨ µ, p¯) = 1, Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) = 1, and Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯) = 1.
Case 2: Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′) = 0, Rˇd∗(λ ∨ µ, p¯) = 1, Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) = 0, and Rˇd∗(λ ∨ µ, p¯) = 0.
We consider each case and derive a contradiction.
Case 1: By Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯) = 1, there exists α ∈ Xd∗ (p¯) with α · λ = 1. By (4) and (10),12 we
have α ∈ Xd∗ (p¯′). This implies that Rˇd∗(λ, p¯′) = 1, a contradiction to Rˇd∗(λ, p¯′) = 0.
Case 2: By Rˇd∗(λ ∨ µ, p¯) = 1 and Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) = 0, there exists α ∈ Xd∗ (p¯) such that α · λ\µ = 1.
By Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) = 0, we have β ·µ = 0 for all β ∈ Xd∗ (p¯). Together with (4), we obtain α ∈ Xd∗ (p¯′).
This implies that Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′) = 1, a contradiction to Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′) = 0.
We resume the proof of Theorem 4 for E∗. Suppose to the contrary that there exists
µ ∈ Ω˜ such that µ 6= 0 and ∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ, p) ≥
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(µ, p).
Together with Theorem 3 for E∗,∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ, p) =
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(µ, p). (36)
Let p¯′ ≡ p¯+ (µ) · µ. In view of the maximality of p¯, it suffices to prove that
p¯′ is an equilibrium price vector for E∗. (37)
12We need (10) to complete the logic here. To see this point, suppose that Xd∗ (p¯) = {1lω, 1lψ}, where
(λ∧µ)ω = 1 and (µ\λ)ψ = 1. Then, without (10), increasing the prices in supp+µ might entail 1lω /∈ Xd∗ (p¯′)
and 1lψ ∈ Xd∗ (p¯′). Then, we have Rˇd∗(λ, p¯′) = 0, which cannot yield a contracition.
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In view of Theorem 3 for E∗, to prove (37), it suffices to prove that, for an arbitrarily chosen
λ ∈ Ω˜, ∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ, p¯′) ≤
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′), and (38)∑
d∈D
Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′) ≤
∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ, p¯′). (39)
Proof of (38): ∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ, p¯) +
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ, p¯′)−
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ ∧ µ, p¯)
≤
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ ∨ µ, p¯)
≤
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ ∨ µ, p¯)
≤
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) +
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′)−
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯)
=
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ, p) +
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′)−
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯),
where the first inequality follows from Claim 3(iii), the second inequality follows from The-
orem 3 for E∗, the third inequality follows from Claim 3(iv), and the equality follows from
(36). The above inequality implies∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ, p¯′)−
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ ∧ µ, p¯) ≤
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ, p¯
′)−
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯). (40)
By Theorem 3 for E∗, ∑
h∈H
Rˆh(λ ∧ µ, p¯) ≤
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(λ ∧ µ, p¯). (41)
(40) and (41) imply (38).
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Proof of (39): ∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ\µ, p¯) ≤
∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ, p¯′)−
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ, p¯) +
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ\λ, p¯)
=
∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ, p¯′)−
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) +
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ\λ, p¯)
≤
∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ, p¯′)−
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(µ, p¯) +
∑
d∈D
Rˇd∗(µ\λ, p¯)
≤
∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ, p¯′) +
∑
d∈D
Rˆd∗(λ\µ, p¯)−
∑
d∈D
Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′),
where the first inequality follows from Claim 3(ii), the equality follows from (36), the second
inequality follows from Theorem 3 for E∗, and the last inequality follows from Claim 3(i).
The above inequality implies∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ\µ, p¯) +
∑
d∈D
Rˆd∗(λ, p¯
′) ≤
∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ, p¯′) +
∑
d∈D
Rˆd∗(λ\µ, p¯). (42)
By Theorem 3 for E∗, ∑
h∈H
Rˇh(λ\µ, p¯) ≥
∑
d∈D
Rˆd∗(λ\µ, p¯). (43)
(42) and (43) imply (39).
5.2.3 Proof of Theorem 4 for E
By (8), for any d ∈ D and λ ∈ Ω˜, we have
Rˇd∗(λ, p¯) = Rˇ
d(λ, p¯).
As proven in Subsection 5.2.2, Theorem 4 holds for E∗. Together with the above equation,
we obtain the desired claim.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 5
As p is an equilibrium price vector for E , there exists a corresponding equilibrium allo-
cation α ∈ Ω˜. If αd′ = 0, then we immediately conclude that p−d′ is an equilibrium price
vector for E−d′ . Thus, in the remaining part, we assume αd′ 6= 0, i.e., there exists h′ ∈ H
such that αd
′
(d′,h′) = 1. Let ω
′ ≡ (d′, h′),  ≡ (1lω′), and p′ ≡ p+  · 1lω′ .13
13See (4) for the definition of (·).
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Claim 4. αh
′
/∈ Xh′(p′).
Proof. At p¯′, only the price of ω′ increases from p¯. Together with αd
′
ω′ = 1 and monotonicty
of utility in money, we have αd
′ ∈ Xd′(p′). Moreover, as the change in pω′ does not affect
the demand/supply correspondences of the agents except d′ and h′, we obtain αi ∈ X i(p′)
for all i ∈ I\{d′, h′}. Thus, if αh′ ∈ Xh′(p′), then p′ is an equilibrium price vector for E with
the corresponding equilibrium allocation α, a contradiction to the maximality of p¯. Hence,
we must have αh
′
/∈ Xh′(p′).
Claim 5. There exists β ∈ Xh′(p) such that βω′ = 0.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., suppose βω′ = 1 for all β ∈ Xh′(p). This implies
vh
′
[p′](αh
′
) = vh
′
[p′](β) for all β ∈ Xh′(p).
Moreover, by (4), we have Xh(p¯′) ⊆ Xh(p¯). Together with thet above equation, we obtain
αh
′ ∈ Xh′(p′), a contradiction to Claim 4.
Claim 6. For any h ∈ H, there exists β ∈ Xh(p) such that β(d′,h) = 0.
Proof. For any h ∈ H\{h′}, by αd′ω′ = αh′ω′ = 1, we have αh(d′,h) = 0. Since αh ∈ Xh(p¯), the
claim holds for h ∈ H\{h′}. Together with Claim 5, we obtain the desired condition.
Claim 7. Let µ ∈ Ω˜ be such that µ(d′,h) = 0 for all h ∈ H. Then, for any h ∈ H,
Rˇh−d′(µ−d′ , p−d′) ≥ Rˇh(µ, p).
Proof. Let h ∈ H be arbitrarily chosen. Let ψ ≡ (d′, h) and β ∈ Qˇh(µ, p) be such that
βψ ≤ β′ψ for all β′ ∈ Qˇh(µ, p). (44)
Suppose to the contrary that βψ = 1. By Claim 6, there exists β
′ ∈ Xh(p) such that β′ψ = 0.
By M\-convexity, for ψ ∈ supp+(β − β′), there exists ψ′ ∈ supp−(β − β′) ∪ {0} such that
β − 1lψ + 1lψ′ ∈ Xh(p), β′ + 1lψ − 1lψ′ ∈ Xh(p).
Let β∗ ≡ β − 1lψ + 1lψ′ . Since µψ = 0, we have β∗ · µ ≥ β · µ, which implies β∗ ∈ Qˇh(µ, p).
Moreover, by the choice of ψ′, we have ψ′ 6= ψ. Then, β∗ψ = 0 < 1 = βψ, a contradiction
to (44). Hence, βψ = 0. This implies β−d′ ∈ Xh−d′(p−d′) and β−d′ · µ−d′ = β · µ = Rˇh(µ, p).
Together with the definition of Rˇh−d′(·, ·), we obtain the desired condition.
Claim 8.
∑
d∈D\{d′} Rˆ
d
−d′(λ, p−d′) ≤
∑
h∈H Rˇ
h
−d′(λ, p−d′) for all λ ∈ Ω˜−d′.
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists λ ∈ Ω˜−d′ such that∑
d∈D\{d′}
Rˆd−d′(λ, p−d′) >
∑
h∈H
Rˇh−d′(λ, p−d′). (45)
We define µ ∈ Ω˜ by µω = λω for all ω ∈ (D\{d′})×H and µω = 0 for all ω ∈ {d′}×H; note
that µ−d′ = λ. Then, by (5),
Rˆd−d′(λ, p−d′) = Rˆ
d(µ, p) for all d ∈ D\{d′}. (46)
By µω = 0 for all ω ∈ {d′} ×H,
Rˆd
′
(µ, p) = 0. (47)
By Claim 7,
Rˇh−d′(λ, p−d′) ≥ Rˇh(µ, p) for all h ∈ H. (48)
By (45)-(48), we obtain ∑
d∈D
Rˆd(µ, p) >
∑
h∈H
Rˇh(µ, p),
which is a contradiction to Theorem 3.
Claim 9.
∑
h∈H Rˆ
h
−d′(λ, p−d′) ≤
∑
d∈D\{d′} Rˇ
d
−d′(λ, p−w′) for all λ ∈ Ω˜−d′.
Proof. Let λ ∈ Ω˜−d′ . Define µ ∈ Ω˜ by µω = λω for all ω ∈ (D\{d′})×H and µω = 1 for all
ω ∈ {d′} ×H; note that µ−d′ = λ. By Theorem 4,∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ, p) ≤
∑
d∈D
Rˇd(µ, p)− 1. (49)
By (6),
Rˇd−d′(λ, p−d′) = Rˇ
d(µ, p) for all d ∈ D\{d′}.
By αd
′ 6= 0 and µω = 1 for all ω ∈ {d′} ×H,
Rˇd
′
(µ, p) = 1.
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The above two equations imply∑
d∈D
Rˇd(µ, p)− 1 =
∑
d∈D\{d′}
Rˇd−d′(λ, p−d′).
Bearing this equation and (49) in mind, to prove the desired inequality, it suffices to prove
that ∑
h∈H
Rˆh−d′(λ, p−d′) ≤
∑
h∈H
Rˆh(µ, p).
Let h ∈ H be arbitrarily chosen. To prove the above inequality, it suffices to prove that
Rˆh−d′(λ, p−d′) ≤ Rˆh(µ, p). (50)
Proof of (50): Let ψ ≡ (d′, h). Let β ∈ Qˆh(µ, p) be such that.
βψ ≤ β′ψ for all β′ ∈ Qˆh(µ, p). (51)
Suppose to the contrary that βψ = 1. By Claim 6, there exists β
′ ∈ Xh(p) such that β′ψ = 0.
By M\-convexity, for ψ ∈ supp+(β − β′), there exists ψ′ ∈ supp−(β − β′) ∪ {0} such that
β − 1lψ + 1lψ′ ∈ Xh(p), β′ + 1lψ − 1lψ′ ∈ Xh(p).
Let β∗ ≡ β − 1lψ + 1lψ′ . Since µψ = 1, we have β∗ · µ ≤ β · µ, which implies β∗ ∈ Qˆh(µ, p).
Moreover, by the choice of ψ′, we have ψ′ 6= ψ. Then, β∗ψ = 0 < 1 = βψ, a contradiction
to (51). Hence, βψ = 0. This implies β−d′ ∈ Xh−d′(p−d′) and β−d′ · µ−d′ = β · µ = Rˆh(µ, p).
Together with the definition of Rˆh−d′(·, ·), we obtain (50).
Combining Corollary 1 with Claims 8 and 9, we conclude that p−d′ is an equilibrium price
vector for E−d′ .
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